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Renz: Post-Conviction Relief in Montana

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN MONTANA
Jeffrey T. Renz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

One commonly hears complaints about endless criminal appeals. Duncan McKenzie has been on Montana's death row since
1975. His direct and post-conviction appeals take up thirteen entries in the Montana Digest, and these are only a partial listing.
When I attended the NAACP Legal Defense Fund conference on
capital litigation in 1991, I commented that while Montana had
added some prisoners to death row, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals seems to treat its cases as if they arrived with a presumption
of error. A former law clerk from the Ninth Circuit told me after
the meeting that my analysis was accurate.
McKenzie and other capital and non-capital prisoners are entitled to seek relief in Montana state courts by means of the Montana Post-Conviction Hearing Act (MPCHA). 1 Since 1967, Montana has developed a substantial body of case law interpreting and
applying the MPCHA. No one has compiled this body of law into a
coherent description of the rules applied in post-conviction cases.
Moreover, I do not intend to engage in an in-depth analysis of
post-conviction relief for death row prisoners. Capital litigation is
as rare and specialized as antitrust litigation. Rather, I intend to
review and describe Montana's post-conviction jurisprudence.
However, this Article will reveal some of the reasons why Montana's capital prisoners seem to enjoy endless appeals.
Once convicted, prisoners' litigation does not necessarily end
with their first, direct appeal. They may exercise both federal and
state post-conviction remedies. The criminal defense bar must understand the scope of these remedies, how they interrelate, and
how actions at the trial level and on direct appeal will affect resort
to post-conviction remedies. This Article reviews the history and
background of the MPCHA. It then discusses the procedural rules
found in the MPCHA and in the case law interpreting it. The Article briefly discusses the relationship between state post-conviction
relief and federal habeas corpus and the federal doctrines of ex* Assistant Professor, University of Montana School of Law; Director, Montana Defender Project, University of Montana School of Law; B.A., 1971, University of Montana;
J.D., 1979, University of Montana. I wish to thank Professor William Crowley and the Honorable Russell K. Fillner, members of the 1963 Criminal Code Commission, for their comments and assistance.
1. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-101 to -203 (1993).
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haustion and procedural default based on independent and adequate state grounds. After reviewing Montana's treatment of
claims of waiver, the Article suggests that because Montana does
not apply a consistent waiver rule, federal courts are unlikely to
apply the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds
when that defense is raised to a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The Article reaches the same conclusion with respect to Montana's
application of the MPCHA's statute of limitations. Finally, the Article discusses the current status of the writ of habeas corpus in
Montana.2
II.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Prior to 1967, post-conviction relief was available through various common law writs, including the writ of habeas corpus and
the writ of error coram nobis. For nearly a century, the Territorial
Supreme Court and the Montana Supreme Court limited the writ
of habeas corpus largely to its usage at common law. This circumstance continued until the 1950s and 1960s when post-conviction
litigation increased exponentially. 3 The Montana Supreme Court
began to expand the scope of the common law writs to accommodate the demand,4 even accepting writs unknown at common law.'
The writ of error coram nobis became the preeminent means
of presenting post-conviction issues to the court, as it continued
efforts to limit the writ of habeas corpus to its common law uses."
The writ of error coram nobis was employed to bring to the court's
attention a fact, unknown to the court, that, if it had been known,
would have warranted a different result.7 Among the various states,
2. Readers should note that the discussion of federal remedies is not complete, much
less exhaustive. Readers who seek further information on federal post-conviction remedies
should consult JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1988).
3. See Morsette v. Ellsworth, 151 Mont. 319, 443 P.2d 28 (1968) (writ issued to vacate
guilty plea of 17-year-old defendant with eighth-grade education who entered plea without
counsel); Harding v. State, 149 Mont. 147, 424 P.2d 130 (1967) (original proceeding) (violation of Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); Nelson v. State, 144 Mont. 439, 397 P.2d
700 (1964) (original proceeding for habeas corpus claiming Gideon required appointment of
counsel); In re Alden, 143 Mont. 457, 391 P.2d 701 (1964) (addressing and rejecting merits
of habeas petition complaining of various pretrial and trial errors); State v. Hales, 124 Mont.
614, 230 P.2d 960 (1951) (first use of writ of error coram nobis).
4. See State ex rel. Estes v. Justice Court, 129 Mont. 136, 141, 284 P.2d 249, 251
(1955) (Adair, J., dissenting) (stating that the court must adopt some kind of post-conviction remedy).
5. State v. Zumwalt, 129 Mont. 529, 533, 291 P.2d 257, 259 (1955) ("[tlhe writ issued
by this court in this proceeding, whatever its name, is revisory in its purpose and appellate
in its command").
6. Butler v. State, 139 Mont. 437, 365 P.2d 822 (1961).
7. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Holloway v. United States, 393 F.2d
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the writ was used after conviction where mob violence or other
means had induced an involuntary guilty plea,8 the prosecution
had purposely used perjured testimony, 9 the defendant was insane
at the time of trial or plea if the issue was not before the court at
the time, 10 the prosecution had withheld mitigating or exculpatory
evidence,11 the court had not been apprised of the defendant's
young age (where it would have deprived the court of jurisdiction), 2 the accused had been denied counsel, 3 and improprieties
had occurred in jury selection (such as exclusion of jurors on the
basis of race).' 4
The Montana Supreme Court accepted writs of error coram
nobis reluctantly, complaining that inmates were too eager to employ them.' 5 Nevertheless, the Montana Supreme Court iccepted
cases that raised issues that normally would have been addressed
on appeal, although inmates had failed to seek a direct appeal in
their case.' 6 Soon an inconsistent body of law began to develop in
which the court would address the merits in one case and dismiss
another on procedural grounds, notwithstanding the absence of
procedural differences between them. 17 As early as 1956, Professor
Edwin Briggs noted that both the writ of habeas corpus and the
writ of error coram nobis were poor ways to present questions of
constitutional error.' 8
731 (9th Cir. 1968);

LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTON REMEDIES § 8 (1981).
8. Kansas v. Calhoun, 32 P. 38 (Kan. 1893); Sanders v. Indiana, 85 Ind. 318 (1883).
9. New York v. Witkowski, 227 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1967).
10. In re Adler, 35 Ark. 517 (1880).
11. Id.
12. In re Gray, 77 Mo. 160 (1882).
13. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Spence v. Dowd, 145 F.2d 451 (7th
Cir. 1945).
14. Fondren v. Mississippi, 199 So. 2d 625 (Miss. 1967).
15. In re Davis, 141 Mont. 565, 565-67, 380 P.2d 880, 880-82 (1963) (hereinafter Davis
I); In re Davis, 143 Mont. 325, 326, 390 P.2d 100, 100 (1964).
16. Bubnash v. State, 139 Mont. 639, 366 P.2d 867 (1961) (hearing on merits claims of
prejudiced judge, malfeasance by bailiff, illegal arrest, interference with jury, denial of bail,
unprepared attorney); Davis I, 141 Mont. 565, 380 P.2d 880; In re Lowery, 142 Mont. 616,
386 P.2d 76 (1963) (per curiam) (addressing multiple claims of denial of rights and concluding that they must lack merit solely because the defendant had counsel); In re McGrath, 143
Mont. 397, 390 P.2d 452 (1964) (per curiam) (hearing claims of illegal search, involuntary
plea, denial of right to subpoena witnesses, and others on merits although the defendant
had pleaded guilty).
17. Compare the cases cited supra note 16 with, for example, Alden, 143 Mont. 457,
391 P.2d 701 (deeming waived claims of illegal arrest, but hearing claims of trial errors); In
re Brown, 142 Mont. 620, 386 P.2d 73 (1963) (denying petition due to passage of three-andone-half years since conviction); In re Jones, 142 Mont. 619, 386 P.2d 74 (1963) (per curiam)
(dismissing claims of illiteracy, illegal search, and new alibi evidence because they had not
been raised by motion for new trial).
18. Edwin Briggs, "Coram Nobis"-Is It Either an Available or the Most Satisfactory
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Montana was not the only state to recognize these difficulties.
Other states were wrestling with the same issues. In 1949, Illinois
decided to write a post-conviction hearing act from scratch.1 ' Following adoption of post-conviction hearing acts by Illinois,2 0 North
Carolina, 1 and the United States,2 2 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws met and adopted a uniform
act to provide for post-conviction relief.23 The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) was designed to combat shortcomings in post-conviction procedures.2 The Commissioners recognized that a multiplicity of common law writs, together with
varying rules for their use, tended to defeat prisoners' efforts to
correct convictions and sentences obtained in violation of state and
federal law.2 5 The Commission was aware that many petitions for
post-conviction relief were frivolous or otherwise lacked merit.2 6
The Commission intended the UPCPA to address both
shortcomings.
Drawing on the federal post-conviction procedure act, 28
U.S.C. § 2255, and the Illinois and North Carolina acts, the
UPCPA consolidated the writs of error coram nobis and habeas
corpus into one readily accessible statutory remedy.2 7 The Commissioners sought to reduce the burden on the courts by providing
for summary dismissa 2 8 of meritless petitions.29 Recognizing that
many petitions would be filed without the assistance of counsel,
the UPCPA relaxed pleading requirements. 3 ° The UPCPA made it
clear that its remedy would supplant neither a motion for a new
trial nor a direct appeal.31 While the UPCPA would supplant other
Post-Conviction Remedy to Test Constitutionality in Criminal Proceedings?, 17 MONT. L.
REV. 160 (1956).
19. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 9 F.R.D. 347
(1949).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 826-32 (1953); see also Jenner, supra note 19.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1953).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
23. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, 122, 202 (1955) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; Robert A. Leflar, Note, Uniform Post
Conviction Act, 11 ARK. L. REV. & BAR ASS'N J. 397 (1957).

24.

HANDBOOK,

supra note 23, at 202.

25. UNIF. POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11 U.L.A. 479-83 (1978) (discussing the
commissioners' prefatory notes) [hereinafter UPCPA]; see In re Rothrock, 92 P.2d 634, 635
(Cal. 1939) (seeking relief under more than nine common-law writs and processes).
26. HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 202.
27. Baker v. Sheriff of Santa Fe County, 477 F.2d 118, 119 (10th Cir. 1973) (28 U.S.C.
§ 2255); Dionne v. Idaho, 459 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Idaho 1969).
28. UPCPA § 6(b).
29. UPCPA § 6.
30. UPCPA §§ 3-4.
31. UPCPA § 1(b).
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statutory remedies, the Commission did not intend the UPCPA to
abolish the common law writs.
Montana could benefit from the unhappy experiences of its
sister states, whose inconsistent use of common law writs had led
to criticism by the United States Supreme Court. s" The United
States Supreme Court also had suggested that it soon would require the states to provide some kind of post-conviction process to
permit state review of those federal constitutional issues that could
not be addressed on appeal. 3 Against this background, Montana
adopted a Post-Conviction Procedure Act as part of its 1967 revisions to the Code of Criminal Procedure."
III. THE MONTANA POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT

In 1963, the Montana Criminal Law Commission undertook
the massive task of drafting a series of acts governing criminal procedure (Code). It completed its preliminary work in August of 1966
and forwarded several proposals to the 40th Legislative Assembly,
which met the following year.35 The Code included a Post-Conviction Hearing Act (MPCHA) and revised Montana's statutes governing the writ of habeas corpus.
The MPCHA was an amalgam of the UPCPA and the 1963
Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Sections 95-2601, -2605, and
-2607 of the MPCHA s were drawn from sections 1, 7, and 8 of the
UPCPA. These provisions established jurisdiction in the district
courts, provided for the procedures for hearing post-conviction petitions, and limited successor petitions. Sections 95-2602 and 32. See Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 570 (1947); Jenner, supra note 19, at 348-57;
Briggs, supra note 18, at 184-86.
33. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 (1934); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 23940 (1949) (stating that the Due Process Clause requires that a process be provided to a state
prisoner to raise federal questions in connection with his confinement). In Case v. Nebraska,
381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965), the Court granted certiorari to answer the question of whether the
Due Process Clause requires the states to provide some kind of post-conviction process. See
also DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 216
(1983) (suggesting that the Court's urging in Case and other opinions led to the adoption of
the UPCPA in 46 states).
34. 1967 Mont. Laws 196, 458-60, § 1; MONT. REV. CODE §§ 95-2601 to -2607 (1947)
(now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-101 to -203 (1993)).
35. Wesley Castles & Larry M. Elison, Foreword to MONTANA CRIMINAL LAW COMMISSION, PROPOSED MONTANA CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1966) [hereinafter PROPOSED
CODE]. The Commission did not complete its work until 1973, when it sent a proposed Code
of Criminal Procedure to the legislature. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Russell
K. Fillner, District Court Judge, Thirteenth Judicial District, Billings, Mont. (Apr. 21,
1994).
36. Now codified respectively at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-101, -201, -105 (1993).
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26031" were based on the 1963 Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing
Act 8 and established filing requirements.
The legislature has amended the MPCHA several times since
1967. A series of 1981 amendments sought to limit a prisoner's access to a post-conviction remedy. The legislature amended section
46-21-102 to establish a five-year limitations period from the date
of conviction. The legislature amended section 46-21-105 to delete
the former provision which permitted petitioners to raise new constitutional grounds for relief, notwithstanding their filing of an earlier petition. The legislature also provided that failure to raise issues that could be raised on direct appeal barred consideration of
those issues on post-conviction relief.3 9 Finally, the legislature reduced the time to appeal from a decision on post-conviction relief
from six months to sixty days." ' As we shall see, the legislature's
efforts were largely for naught.
Since its enactment, the MPCHA has been the subject of a
large amount of litigation, largely on pro se petitions filed by inmates. This litigation created the body of jurisprudence to which
this Article now turns.
IV.

PROCEDURE

The Commission intended the MPCHA to provide a procedure
to address claims that would have been raised by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a petition for writ of error coram
nobis. Its procedure successfully has eliminated confusion over the
forms available for relief, partly because the Montana Supreme
Court has applied liberally the MPCHA's relaxed pleading rule.
The court has treated most post-conviction motions as petitions
for post-conviction relief, even though they were not denominated
as such."1 Under the MPCHA, a person "adjudged guilty" may
37.
38.

Now codified respectively at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-103, -104 (1993).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 122-1, 122-2 (1963).

39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-105(2) (1993).
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-203 (1993). The Code Commissioner's comments to this
provision suggest that the 60-day period was adopted to provide additional time to a confined, unrepresented petitioner. However, the time to appeal is the same for a direct appeal.
Mont. R. App. P. 5(b). The Uniform Code Commissioners had proposed that a six-month
period be adopted with the prisoner's disabilities in mind. HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 214;
UPCPA, supra note 24, at 535.

41.

State v. George, 224 Mont. 495, 730 P.2d 412 (1986) (motion to amend judgment);

State v. LaTray, 220 Mont. 358, 715 P.2d 52 (1986) (motion to withdraw guilty plea); see
also Tecca v. McCormick, 246 Mont. 317, 318, 806 P.2d 11, 12 (1990) (petition for habeas
corpus treated as post-conviction petition); State v. Perry, 232 Mont. 455, 758 P.2d 268

(1988) (treating untimely post-conviction petition as petition for habeas corpus or petition
for error coram nobis).
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seek post-conviction relief if he claims that his sentence was imposed in violation of state or federal law, that the court lacked jurisdiction, that a suspended or deferred sentence was improperly
revoked, that the sentence exceeded that permitted by law, or that
the sentence is subject to collateral attack for any other reason
that might be raised by any other remedy. 42 Typical grounds have
included: challenges to pretrial proceedings and sentencing where
the accused has been convicted as a result of a guilty plea, 43 claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, 4 challenges to the sentence itself,4 5 and claims of new evidence.46 Petitioner need not be confined in order to obtain relief. 47 Post-conviction relief is available
to death row inmates even though they are not serving a sentence
of confinement. 4 Although the MPCHA refers to a "sentence imposed in violation of the constitution," it is clear from its remaining provisions that the conviction underlying the sentence may be
collaterally attacked. Section 46-21-201(5) directs that the court, if
it finds for the petitioner, to "enter an appropriate order with re49
spect to the judgment or sentence.
The venue for a petition for post-conviction relief is the
county in which the sentencing court sat, and the petition is to be
addressed to the court that imposed sentence. 50 However, the dis42. MONT.CODE ANN. § 46-21-101(1) (1993).
43. Bishop v. State, 254 Mont. 100, 103, 835 P.2d 732, 734 (1992); State v. Wilson, 198
Mont. 305, 313-14, 645 P.2d 958, 963-64 (1982) (claim of incompetence at time of entry of
plea); In re Hardy, 188 Mont. 506, 508, 614 P.2d 528, 529 (1980) (petition to withdraw plea);
State v. Haynie, 186 Mont. 374, 377-78, 607 P.2d 1128, 1131 (1980) (no assistance of counsel
and not informed of maximum penalty when entering guilty plea); In re Barry, 155 Mont.
231, 232, 466 P.2d 586, 587 (1970) (per curiam).
44. DiGiallonardo v. Betzer, 163 Mont. 104, 105, 515 P.2d 705, 705-06 (1973) (per
curiam); In re Evans, 158 Mont. 76, 77, 488 P.2d 906, 907 (1971) (hearing on merits claim
that he should have received new counsel when a conflict developed between him and his co-

defendant); In re Peterson, 155 Mont. 239, 239, 467 P.2d 281, 281 (1970).
45. In re LeDesma, 171 Mont. 54, 554 P.2d 751 (1976) (granting credit for time served
as part of suspended sentence); In re Hanson, 169 Mont. 80, 83, 544 P.2d 816, 817 (1976);
Spinler v. State, 152 Mont. 69, 71-72, 446 P.2d 429, 429-30 (1968) (following revocation of a
deferred sentence, petitioner was sentenced to prison and fined $3,000, to be worked off at
$2 per day; finding an equal protection violation, the court vacated the fine and set petitioner free).
46. In re Martin, 240 Mont. 419, 421, 787 P.2d 746, 747 (1989) (addressing claims of
new evidence on merits and finding it cumulative); Harris v. State, 234 Mont. 482, 484-86,
765 P.2d 706, 707-08 (1988). But see Tecca v. McCormick, 246 Mont. 317, 318-19, 806 P.2d
11, 12 (1990) (barring claim of new evidence because the defendant did not appeal from his
guilty plea).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-101 cmt. (1993).
48. Coleman v. State, 194 Mont. 428, 436, 633 P.2d 624, 629 (1981).
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-201(5) (1993).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-101(1), (2) (1993); State v. Standley, 192 Mont. 54, 55,
626 P.2d 248, 249 (1981).
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trict court has jurisdiction over petitions for post-conviction relief
from sentences imposed by courts of limited jurisdiction." Furthermore, one may petition directly to the supreme court if he is in
custody. 2
Indigent petitioners are entitled to a transcript of the relevant
portions of their trial or pretrial proceedings at no cost. 53 However,
the transcript is not automatically available on request. Petitioners
must show a need for the particular portion of the transcript they
seek.5 4
While there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a postconviction proceeding,5 5 the statute requires appointment of counsel if a hearing will be necessary.56 In complex cases or in those
that require the development of facts through witness testimony,
section 16 of the Montana Declaration of Rights, article II, section
16 of the Montana Constitution, and the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution appear to compel the district court to
appoint counsel to provide an indigent prisoner access to the
courts. In State v. Lance57 and State v. Perry,58 counsel were appointed to assist inmates in their pre- and post-conviction habeas
corpus proceedings. In State v. Hintz,5 9 counsel was appointed to
assist in proceedings on a petition for post-conviction relief. In In
re Martin,6 0 the supreme court held that counsel was properly denied in a post-conviction proceeding where the issues raised by
Martin could be easily determined on the record." In similar cases,
federal courts have held that fundamental fairness requires the assistance of counsel and other financial assistance in factually or le51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-101(2) (1993); see State v. Christensen, No. 92-537
(Mont.) (appeal filed).
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-101(3) (1993).
53. In re O'Rourke, 148 Mont. 93, 94-95, 417 P.2d 226, 226 (1966).
54. In re Parker, 162 Mont. 330, 332, 511 P.2d 973, 974 (1973); In re Harvey, 153
Mont. 480, 481-82, 466 P.2d 93, 93 (1969).
55. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, - (1991); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 554-55 (1987).
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-201(2) (1993).
57. 222 Mont. 92, 106, 721 P.2d 1258, 1268 (1986).
58. 232 Mont. 455, 460-61, 758 P.2d 268, 271 (1988).
59. 213 Mont. 364, 366, 691 P.2d 814, 815 (1984).
60. 240 Mont. 419, 422-23, 787 P.2d 746, 748 (1989).
61. Compare Merchants Ass'n v. Conger, 185 Mont. 552, 554, 606 P.2d 125, 126 (1979)
(requiring an indigent to pay an undertaking in an amount twice the judgment in justice
court, as a condition to a de novo appeal of a civil case, violated Article II, § 16 of the
Montana Constitution); Sullivan v. Silver Bow Bd. of County Comm., 124 Mont. 364, 369,
224 P.2d 135, 136 (1950) (the predecessor of § 16 required the provision of a transcript at
no charge to an indigent appellant); State ex rel. Parmenter v. District Court, 111 Mont.
453, 455, 110 P.2d 971, 971 (1941) (indigent prisoner's right to free transcript based on right
of access to courts).
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gaily complex cases.2
The petition must be verified.63 It must identify the matter in
which and the crime for which the petitioner was convicted, state
the date of final judgment, identify any prior proceedings for relief
from the conviction (appeals, post-conviction petitions, and other
remedies), and affidavits and other evidence supporting the allegations of the petition must be attached (or include an explanation
of why none are attached).4 The statute requires an accompanying
legal memorandum.6
Post-conviction petitions are subject to rule 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Montana Supreme
Court has held: "It is not error to deny an application for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing if the allegations
are without merit or would otherwise not entitle the petitioner to
relief."' Moreover, the statute makes it clear that the court may
dismiss the petition sua sponte, before service is made on the
State. 7 If a meritorious petition withstands a motion to dismiss,
the court may decide the case on the merits, as presented by the
pleadings or on the basis of evidence introduced at hearing. 8 In
either event, the court must make findings of fact and conclusions
of law.6 9 At hearing, the statute relaxes some of the rules of evi62. The Seventh Circuit has established a set of workable standards to determine
when counsel should be appointed and other assistance should be provided. Wilson v. Duckworth, 716 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1983). Under the Seventh Circuit approach, the court considers: (1) whether the inmate has a colorable claim, (2) the ability of the indigent inmate to
investigate the facts, (3) whether the nature of the evidence expected to be heard indicates
that the truth will be exposed where both sides have counsel, (4) the capability of the indigent inmate to prepare and present his own case, and (5) the complexity of the legal issues.
Id. at 418; see United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1982)
(complexity of issues); Walters v. Jago, 642 F.2d 194, 194 (6th Cir. 1981) (remanding for
appointment of counsel to assist in arguing issue that trial exhibit was impermissably suggestive); Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding assistance of law-trained
personnel necessary); Norris v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 846 (1979) (counsel not appointed in state post-conviction proceeding); Pike v.
United States, 330 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (issue is competence to enter
guilty plea); United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 948 (1963) (triable issues of fact); Green v. United States, 158 F.
Supp. 804, 808 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1958) (complexity of
issues); Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1351-55 (M.D. Fla. 1982), appeal dismissed, 716 F.2d 913 (11th Cir. 1983) (recognizing need for counsel in more complex cases);
cf. 28 C.F.R. § 543.10 to .15 (1993).

63.
64.

MONT CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

65.
66.

MONT. CODE ANN.

67.
68.
69.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 46-21-103 (1993).
§ 46-21-104(1) (1993).

§ 46-21-104(2) (1993).
Coleman v. State, 194 Mont. 428, 433, 633 P.2d 624, 631-32 (1981).

§ 46-21-201(1) (1993).
§ 46-21-201(1).
§ 46-21-201(1).
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dence. Discovery is available with leave of court;70 and at the hearing, the parties may submit evidence by means of affidavit, deposition, or oral testimony. The prisoner may attend the hearing, in
the court's discretion. 71 Although release was the typical remedy
under habeas corpus, if a prisoner prevails on post-conviction relief, the court may fashion such relief as it deems necessary. 2
While a petition for post-conviction relief is denominated a
civil remedy, the district courts are not bound by the Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure when they conduct a hearing.73 Unfortunately, the supreme court has not determined which rules, if any,
should apply. It would appear then that the district court's application of or refusal to apply or follow any rule of civil procedure is
reviewable as an abuse of discretion, rather than as an error of law.
On the other hand, the Rules of Appellate Procedure apparently
apply to appeals under the MPCHA 4
Since post-conviction relief is a civil action, the burden of
proof, which is on the petitioner, is preponderance of the evidence.75 On appeal, the supreme court applies the substantial evidence rule to findings of fact by the district court. 7 The decision
to grant or deny an application for post-conviction relief is discreby the appellate court absent a
tionary and will not be disturbed
77
clear abuse of discretion.

Petitioners have little interest in bringing their claims before
the judges who sentenced them and who likely presided at their
trials. Even though post-conviction relief is a civil action, the supreme court holds that the automatic disqualification provisions of
section 3-1-803 of the Montana Code do not apply.78 A judge may
be disqualified for cause, pursuant to section 3-1-805, 7 but the

court will not permit disqualification of judges on grounds that
they are witnesses unless the petitioner shows that "specific and
compelling evidence" is to be elicited from them and cannot be
70.
71.

72.
73.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

§

46-21-201(3) (1993).

§

46-21-201(4) (1993).

§

46-21-201(5) (1993).
State v. Coates, 241 Mont. 331, 334, 786 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1990).

74. Cf. LaVallie v. McCormick, No. 92-502 (Mont., Dec. 1, 1992) (unpublished order)
(applying rules of appellate procedure to appeal from order granting writ of habeas corpus).
75. Yother v. State, 182 Mont. 351, 355, 597 P.2d 79, 82 (1979); In re Jones, 176 Mont.
412, 415, 578 P.2d 1150, 1152 (1978).
76. Yother, 182 Mont. at 355, 597 P.2d at 82; In re Jones, 176 Mont. at 415, 578 P.2d
at 1152.
77. Coleman v. State, 194 Mont. 428, 433, 633 P.2d 624, 627 (1981); see MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-21-201 (1993).
78. Coleman, 194 Mont. at 432-33, 633 P.2d at 627.
79. State v. Duncan, 191 Mont. 253, 255, 623 P.2d 953, 954 (1981).
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obtained elsewhere.8 0 However, judges must recuse themselves if
they acted as defense counsel in the case."
A petition for post-conviction relief is not necessarily moot because the sentence has been served."' However, the petition may be
deemed moot if it attacks only the validity of a discharged sentence." Other courts have deemed post-conviction petitions to be
moot where the prisoner has died,8 4 escaped,8 5 been pardoned, or
received relief through other avenues.88

V.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND
THE FEDERAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

A defendant's actions at the trial level and on direct appeal
can result in denial of a federal writ of habeas corpus on procedural grounds.8 7 The same is true for actions taken on post-conviction relief.8 8 Before federal courts will hear a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by a prisoner in state custody, they must be
satisfied that the prisoner has brought the issues before the state's
highest court of appeals.8 9 This is a rule of comity, and federal
courts routinely dismiss habeas petitions that contain unexhausted
claims.8 0
Federal courts also will dismiss on motion petitions from state
court decisions that are based on independent and adequate state
grounds. In Coleman v. Thompson, the United States Supreme
Court explained this doctrine:
In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity
and federalism. Without the rule, a federal district court would be
able to do in habeas what this Court could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run
80. Coleman, 194 Mont. at 435, 633 P.2d at 628.
81. State v. Hintz, 205 Mont. 295, 298, 667 P.2d 434, 435 (1983).
82. State v. Standley, 192 Mont. 54, 56, 626 P.2d 248, 249 (1981).
83. State v. Jelle, 201 Mont. 111, 115, 651 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1982).
84. Hann v. Hawk, 205 F.2d 839, 840 (8th Cir. 1953).
85. Beck v. Ault, 212 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1975).
86. Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318 U.S. 792 (1943) (pardon); Belton v. United States, 259
F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (other relief).
87. See Selvage v. Collins, 494 U.S. 108 (1990) (per curiam) (remanding case to state
court to determine whether petitioner's failure to raise the claim that his capital sentencing
jury was precluded from considering his mental retardation was procedurally barred).
(1991).
88. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 89. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).
90. Id.; see Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987); Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254
(1986).
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around the limits of this Court's jurisdiction and a means to undermine the State's interest in enforcing its laws.91
Federal courts hold that where a state court denies a claim on such
procedural grounds as waiver or failure to timely file, this constitutes an independent and adequate state ground for decision.9 2
However, whether a state court decision rests on independent
and adequate state grounds is a federal question. 3 The United
States Supreme Court holds that a state court decision rests on
independent and adequate state grounds if: (1) the decision rests
solely on state law grounds; (2) the state court makes clear by a
statement in the opinion that it has relied on federal cases as persuasive in its interpretation of state law; or (3) the state court decision otherwise indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide, separate, and independent state
grounds. 9 4 The mere existence of a possible state ground for decision, however, does not resolve the issue.
The fact that an independent and adequate state ground was
available to the state court does not bar the federal court from
hearing a habeas petition. The United States Supreme Court holds
that "the state court must actually have relied on the procedural
bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case." ' In
Caldwell v. Missisippi, the Supreme Court also questioned
whether Mississippi consistently applied a waiver rule in capital
cases.9 As Caldwell intimates, if the state policy on waiver is not
clearly established, federal courts should not consider it an independent and adequate state ground for decision. More important
for Montana, if state courts do not consistently adhere to the
waiver doctrine, federal courts will not treat it as an independent
and adequate state ground that bars federal relief.9 Federal courts
91. Coleman, 501 U.S. at _ .
92. Kellostat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding failure to raise claim at
trial or on direct appeal can result in denial on independent state grounds).
93. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1989).
94. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
95. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985).
96. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328.
97. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 150 (1979) (declining to find independent and adequate state ground where New York had no clear contemporaneous-objection
rule and the state court did not expressly rule that the failure to object earlier constituted a
waiver).
98. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 422-25 (1991) (Georgia's rule requiring that a Batson claim be raised prior to the time jurors are selected would not foreclose federal review of
the issue because the Georgia courts had not applied the procedural rule in another case
decided two years after petitioner's conviction--when it announced it prospectively); Barr
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (where state supreme court inconsistently
applied procedural bar rule, United States Supreme Court would not be precluded from
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also will not treat the state procedural decision as an independent
and adequate state ground where the rule was announced or applied for the first time in the prisoner's case or where the prisoner
otherwise had no notice of it."
Thus, if the Montana Supreme Court finds that a post-conviction petitioner has waived an issue by failing to raise it in the trial
court or on appeal, under current federal decisions this may not
bar review by federal courts. As we now see, the Montana Supreme
Court sometimes applies a waiver rule and sometimes it does not.
Under the current state of the law in Montana, if either a state
district court or the Montana Supreme Court holds that a petitioner waived grounds for relief by failing to raise it earlier, this
should not bar consideration of the issue by federal courts on
habeas corpus.
VI.

WAIVER, DEFAULT, AND RES JUDICATA

When prisoners seek post-conviction relief on grounds that
were not raised in the trial court or that were omitted on direct
appeal, the question of whether they have waived or defaulted the
claim often arises. Where they have previously raised a claim on
appeal or in another post-conviction proceeding, the question of
whether the earlier ruling on that claim is res judicata emerges.
These issues have significance in determining whether prisoners'
claims will be heard by the state court. Should they seek a writ of
habeas corpus from federal courts, these issues then form the basis
for the State's argument that the cases were decided on independent and adequate state grounds and that comity should bar consideration of the federal petition.
The lower courts' and the Montana Supreme Court's treatment of issues of waiver and res judicata contribute to the lengthy
appeal process enjoyed by inmates. The supreme court has been
highly inconsistent in applying both doctrines.
Prior to the 1981 amendments to the MPCHA, the Montana
Supreme Court had applied the doctrine of res judicata to deny
petitions for post-conviction relief when issues were previously
raised and decided on direct appeal. 10 0 Likewise, the court disexercising jurisdiction); Guttierez v. Moriarty, 922 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 140 (1991) (where state courts do not strictly or regularly apply procedural bars, application of the bar in a given case does not constitute an independent and adequate state
ground).
99. Ford, 498 U.S. at 423; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58
(1958).
100. In re Williams, 155 Mont. 226, 466 P.2d 90 (1970) (per curiam) (dismissing peti-
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missed petitions on grounds of waiver where the prisoner failed to
raise the issues in the trial court, on appeal, or in an earlier petition. 10 1 On the other hand, the Montana Supreme Court regularly
heard claims that could have been raised on appeal and that it
could have deemed waived. For example, in State v. Perkins, the
petitioner's appeal from his 1967 conviction was dismissed as untimely. 10 2 Nevertheless, and over the State's argument that his
claims had been waived, the court permitted Perkins to file for
post-conviction relief. The court stated: "We agree that this should
be the rule but in view of the change in counsel and the fact that a
post-conviction proceeding is involved, we will in this instance consider the various contentions of the defendant." 0 3 The court went
on to consider the merits of all claims that would have been raised
on direct appeal.
The following year, the court again addressed the merits of
claims that the petitioner had failed to raise in his direct appeal.
In State v. Porter,the defendant petitioned for rehearing following
the court's affirmance of his conviction. 0 4 He raised new
claims-that he was illegally imprisoned as a prior felon and that
impeachment questions asked of him at trial were improper-that
were not included in his appeal. The court held:
As these issues were not raised in the trial court nor before this
Court upon appeal, and therefore under normal appellate rules
the merits would not be reached since no objections were made,
no record or exceptions preserved. However, since substantial
rights are affected that would be reviewable under our new rules
[MPCHA], we shall treat defendant's 'Petition for Rehearing' as
an application for post-conviction relief in order to reach the
105
merits.
The court then reversed the conviction, finding that petitioner was
entitled to a jury determination as to the fact of his prior felony. 10 6
07
In State v. Brecht,1
known for its announcement of the right
to privacy in the criminal sphere and its application of the exclution because claims of unlawful search had been raised and decided on state's earlier appeal
of a suppression order and that decision is res judicata).
101. Gransberry v. State, 149 Mont. 158, 423 P.2d 853 (1967) (claim that State had
wrongfully amended the information was waived for failure to raise it in the trial court or on
direct appeal).
102. State v. Perkins, 153 Mont. 361, 362, 457 P.2d 465, 466 (1969).
103. Perkins, 153 Mont. at 364, 457 P.2d at 467.
104. State v. Porter, 155 Mont. 64, 65, 466 P.2d 905, 905 (1970).
105. Id. at 65, 466 P.2d at 905-06 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 688, 466 P.2d at 907.
107. 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
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sionary rule to invasions of that right by private citizens, the petitioner had decided not to appeal.1 08 Nevertheless, the court heard
Brecht's privacy claims on their merits and announced two sweeping constitutional rules establishing and applying a right to privacy
in criminal cases.109
In Fitzpatrick v. Crist, the petitioner was tried and convicted
of committing a homicide while imprisoned. 110 He had appealed,
and the supreme court had affirmed his conviction."1 He later
brought a post-conviction proceeding directly to the supreme
court, claiming that the district court was slow to appoint counsel,
that his arraignment was delayed, and that he was denied speedy
11 2
trial-all claims that could have been raised on direct appeal.
With respect to this issue, the court stated:
At the outset it should be observed that we are proceeding on the
assumption petitioner has not waived these issues, despite his
failure to raise them earlier. We do not reject the general proposition that such questions should be interposed as promptly as possible, but only say that the unusual facts of this case make a clear
cut determination of waiver difficult. Unless there is substantial
evidence of waiver, constitutional claims must be heard on their
merits.11 3
This holding becomes more significant when one reads the court's
discussion of the facts of Fitzpatrick's claim. Throughout the pretrial proceedings, Fitzpatrick complained that he had not been appointed counsel and that he had not been arraigned. He demanded
a speedy trial." 4 In other words, he was aware of these claims
before he appealed. Nevertheless, the court heard these claims on
their merits and reversed his conviction."'
108. State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. at 265, 485 P.2d at 48.
109. Id. at 270-72, 485 P.2d at 50-51.
110. Fitzpatrick v. Crist, 165 Mont. 382, 383, 528 P.2d 1322, 1323 (1974).
111. State v. Fitzpatrick, 163 Mont. 220, 516 P.2d 605 (1973).
112. Fitzpatrick v. Crist, 165 Mont. at 383, 528 P.2d at 1323.
113. Id. at 386, 528 P.2d at 1324-25.
114. Id. at 385, 528 P.2d at 1324.
115. Id. at 390, 528 P.2d at 1326; see also Coleman, 194 Mont. at 440, 633 P.2d at 631
(stating: "Because the post-conviction procedure is a new civil remedy, the failure to present
claims in earlier proceedings would not bar them from presentation at this time. However,
we have reviewed the claims and find the same to be unmeritorious."); Parker v. Crist, 190
Mont. 376, 621 P.2d 484 (1980) (addressing and rejecting on the merits some claims of pretrial and trial errors raised seven years after the petitioner's appeal had been decided); Murphy v. State, 181 Mont. 157, 592 P.2d 935 (1979) (granting relief where the petitioner argued
that a letter from a probation officer constituted an improper pre-sentence report); State v.
Jensen, 153 Mont. 489, 458 P.2d 782 (1969) (addressing merits of petitioner's claims that the
statute under which he was charged and sentenced was unconstitutional, but holding petitioner waived his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, although he had raised neither on di-
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While the court has said that it will not allow relitigation of
issues determined on direct appeal because these are governed by
the rule of res judicata, it has done so on a regular basis, even in
those cases where the court has articulated the rule."' It has often
summarily addressed the7 merits of claims that were previously decided on direct appeal.1
In Coleman v. State, the supreme court decided against applying a strict res judicata rule. 1 8 The court announced that it would
apply the rule of Sanders v. United States" 9 to claims that any
ground is barred by res judicata. 2 ° Sanders, a federal post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, permits the
court to give controlling weight to a prior decisions only if: "(1) the
same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the
prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice
would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application."' 1 This last element would give the trial court a safe
harbor to hear petitions that it thought had merit, notwithstanding
a prior adjudication.
On occasion, the supreme court has readjudicated facts. In
Yother v. State, the petitioner claimed that he had been subjected
to double jeopardy by a trial that followed a misdemeanor conviction in justice court.' He had raised the issue in a petition for
habeas corpus prior to his district court trial.'2 3 The district court
found facts against him and refused to issue the writ.124 After losing on that issue, he pleaded guilty. 25 He neither sought habeas
relief from the supreme court nor appealed his conviction. 26 However, he sought post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed
his post-conviction petition, finding, as a matter of fact, that he
rect appeal).
116. See, e.g., Coleman, 194 Mont. at 437, 633 P.2d at 630; Spurlock v. Crist, 188
Mont. 449, 614 P.2d 498 (1980); In re Pepperling, 168 Mont. 517, 546 P.2d 252 (1976); In re
Quigg, 168 Mont. 512, 544 P.2d 441 (1976).
117. See, e.g., DiGiallonardo v. Betzer, 163 Mont. 104, 515 P.2d 705 (1973) (per
curiam) (summarily reaffirming holding on direct appeal); accord Orricer v. South Dakota,
181 N.W.2d 461 (S.D. 1970).
118. Coleman, 194 Mont. at 438-39, 633 P.2d at 630.
119. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
120. Coleman, 194 Mont. at 438, 633 P.2d at 631.
121. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 15; see Coleman, 194 Mont. at 438, 633 P.2d at 630.
122. Yother v. State, 182 Mont. 351, 356, 597 P.2d 79, 82 (1979).
123. Id. at 353, 597 P.2d at 80.
124. Id. at 353, 597 P.2d at 81.
125. Id. at 354, 597 P.2d at 81.
126. Id.
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had entered a voluntary guilty plea.1 2 On appeal, the supreme
128
court reweighed the evidence and found in petitioner's favor.
Thus, during the period prior to the 1981 session of the legislature,
the court routinely heard post-conviction claims over objections
that they had been waived or that they were barred by res
judicata.
The legislature codified the waiver rule in 1981.129 Yet even
after codification, the court continued to hear grounds that could
have been raised on appeal. The court decided Fitzpatrick v. State
two years after the amendment to section 46-21-105.130 Notwithstanding the change in the statute, the court stated:
Because the post-conviction procedure is a civil remedy, the failure to present claims in earlier proceedings will not bar them
from presentation at this time. Nevertheless, the fact that an issue is not raised at a pre-trial hearing, during trial or on direct
appeal will be considered by this Court as an element bearing on
the merits of that particular claim. 1 '
The court then announced a new standard, that of deliberate withholding of grounds, to determine if a claim was waived by failure
to raise it in the trial court or on direct appeal:
It is clearly an abuse of the relief procedure to withhold issues
which could and should have properly been raised on appeal, or
to manufacture issues years later, in an attempt to manipulate
and obstruct the criminal justice process.
...[Tihe statute was intended to prevent the miscarriage of
justice, not to provide an opportunity to manipulate and obstruct
132
justice.
The court applied this standard in State v. Henricks.'3 Noting
that the issues raised by the petitioner could have been raised in
his direct appeal, the court nevertheless addressed their merits,
127. Id. at 355, 597 P.2d at 81.
128. Id. at 355, 597 P.2d at 82.
129. Section 46-21-105 of the Montana Code provides:
(1) All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner under 46-21-101 must be
raised in the original or amended petition. Those grounds for relief not raised are
waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief
that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition.
(2) When a petitioner has been afforded a direct appeal of the petitioner's
conviction, grounds for relief that could reasonably have been raised on direct
appeal may not be raised in the original or amended petition.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-105 (1993).
130. Fitzpatrick v. State, 206 Mont. 205, 671 P.2d 1 (1983).
131. Id. at 210, 671 P.2d at 3.
132. Id. at 211, 671 P.2d at 4.
133. 206 Mont. 469, 672 P.2d 20 (1983).
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observing:
Secondly, as we noted recently in Fitzpatrick v. State, we observe that all of the issues presented here could have been
brought at the time of Henricks's original appeal of his conviction. While we may consider these issues at this time, we will also
take into consideration the fact that these issues, if valid, could
and should have been raised at the time of appeal of the conviction. It is clearly an abuse of the postconviction relief statute to
raise or manufacture issues long after the proper time for presentation of such issues. With the above two factors in mind, we now
34
proceed to the discussion of the issues presented.
Following Fitzpatrick and Henricks, the court continued to
address the merits of grounds that could have been raised on appeal. For example, in In re Arledge, the court addressed the merits
of petitioner's claims that the district court lacked authority to
designate petitioner a dangerous offender at petitioner's revocation
hearing, that petitioner's sentences should have run concurrently
"in the interests of justice," and that the trial court's denial of access to parole was contrary to the interests of society. ' Although
the last two claims were equitable claims that could have been
raised before the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court, the court, without discussing the issue of waiver, ad'
dressed their merits. so
In Brodniak v. State, the supreme court earlier had found
harmless error in the claims that petitioner raised on direct appeal.1 37 Brodniak then brought a petition for post-conviction relief
claiming that the court should have used a federal test for harmless error. ' It is not clear if Brodniak argued for the federal test
on his direct appeal. If he had raised the issue, the supreme court's
decision would have been res judicata. If he did not raise the issue
in his appellate briefs or in a motion for rehearing, his failure arguably amounted to a waiver of the issue under the language of
section 46-21-105. Nevertheless, the court addressed the merits of
Brodniak's claims and reconsidered and reaffirmed the merits of
its earlier harmless error analysis. The court did not discuss the
Fitzpatrick standard.
134. State v. Henricks, 206 Mont. at 474, 672 P.2d at 23 (citation omitted). Fitzpatrick could be considered a pre-1981 amendment case, since the underlying crime occurred
and Fitzpatrick filed his post-conviction petition prior to March 28, 1981, the effective date
of the amendments to § 46-21-105. Henricks is not amenable to that criticism.
135. In re Arledge, 232 Mont. 450, 451, 756 P.2d 1169, 1170 (1988).
136. See id.
137. Brodniak v. State, 239 Mont. 110, 113, 779 P.2d 71, 73 (1989).
138. Id.
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Fitzpatrick and Henricks bar consideration of grounds petitioner or counsel deliberately withheld. Although this would appear to be a workable, reasonable standard, the court has not always applied it. In In re Martin, the court held that petitioner
waived claims of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct by failing to
raise them on direct appeal."" The court did not mention the Fitzpatrick/Henricks standard.
The court revisited the Fitzpatrick/Henricks standard in
State v. Gorder."1 0 There, the petitioner filed a direct appeal, but
asked that it be construed as a petition for post-conviction relief.
In dicta discussing section 46-21-105, the court said: "Abuse of
process occurs where an applicant raises in post-conviction proceedings a factual or legal contention which the petitioner deliberately or inexcusably failed to raise in the proceedings leading to
conviction, or having raised the contention in the court, failed to
141
pursue the matter on appeal.'
The court also has found an absence of waiver in some predictable cases, such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In
State v. Albrecht, for example, petitioner filed a timely notice of
appeal, but it was never docketed.1 42 The State conceded that petitioner had not received proper representation on appeal, since
counsel had failed to follow up. 43 The court decided the claims on
14 4
their merits, as if they had been presented on appeal.
In Albrecht, Martin, and Tecca v. McCormick, the court used
for the first time terms like "procedurally barred" and "default". 4
However, the court has never overruled the Fitzpatrick/Henricks
standard. In 1990, the court again reviewed grounds not raised on
appeal in Hawkins v. State.'4 6 In Hawkins the court found, with
little comment, that some claims had been addressed on appeal
and were barred by res judicata. Hawkins had raised new arguments about these claims.'4 7 Nevertheless, the court addressed the
139. In re Martin, 240 Mont. 419, 421, 787 P.2d 746, 748 (1989).
140. 243 Mont. 333, 792 P.2d 370 (1990).
141. State v. Gorder, 243 Mont. at 335, 792 P.2d at 371 (quoting McKenzie v. Osborne, 195 Mont. 26, 34, 640 P.2d 368, 373 (1981)).
142. State v. Albrecht, 242 Mont. 403, 404, 791 P.2d 760, 761 (1990).
143. Id.
144. Cf. Walker v. State, 261 Mont. 1, 9, 862 P.2d 1, 6 (1993) (holding that unexplained failure to appeal constituted waiver of all claims except ineffective assistance of

counsel).
145. Tecca v. McCormick, 246 Mont. 317, 806 P.2d 11 (1990); State v. Albrecht, 242
Mont. 403, 791 P.2d 760 (1990); In re Martin, 240 Mont. 419, 787 P.2d 746 (1990).
146. 242 Mont. 348, 790 P.2d 990 (1990).
147. Hawkins, 242 Mont. at 351, 790 P.2d at 992.
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merits of Hawkins' claim that State v. Burke' 8 should not have
been applied retroactively to his case, although this argument
could also have been barred by res judicata; that there was a fatal
defect in the information-a claim that could have been deemed
waived for Hawkins' failure to raise it in the district court and on
direct appeal; 14e and that the prosecutor's opening statement had
denied him a fair trial, which was an issue also not raised on appeal. 150 In deciding Hawkins, the court did not mention the Fitzpatrick/Henricks standard.
On the other hand, the court applied section 46-21-105 in
Duncan v. State,'5 ' State v. McColley, 5 and Eiler v. State. 53 In
none of these three cases did the court mention the Fitzpatrick!
Henricks standard. In 1993, one year after Eiler was decided, the
court declined to apply section 46-21-105 in State v. Barker.'5
Barker had pleaded guilty to several felonies but had violated his
probation.15 5 The information in Barker's prosecution had incorrectly listed methamphetamine as a Schedule I drug.' 5" Because
methamphetamine was found in some over-the-counter nasal
sprays, Barker argued that it was legal. 57 He did not raise this
claim in the trial court. The supreme court addressed this ground
on its merits. 5 8
The MPCHA also provides that issues raised in a second petition for post-conviction relief are deemed waived unless the court
finds that the claim could not reasonably have been raised in an
earlier petition or by amendment to an earlier petition.159 As with
the rule of waiver by reason of failure to raise the issue in the trial
court or on appeal, the supreme court has not followed this rule. 160
A guilty plea does not waive the right to petition for post-conviction relief when petitioners attack the entry of their plea or the
148. 235 Mont. 165, 766 P.2d 254 (1988).
149. Hawkins, 242 Mont. at 352, 790 P.2d at 992-93.
150. Id. at 353, 790 P.2d at 993.
151. 243 Mont. 232, 794 P.2d 331 (1990)
152. 247 Mont. 524, 807 P.2d 1358 (1991).
153. 254 Mont. 39, 833 P.2d 1124 (1992).
154. 257 Mont. 31, 847 P.2d 300 (1993).
155. Barker, 257 Mont. at 33, 847 P.2d at 302.
156. Id. at 33, 847 P.2d at 301.
157. Id. at 36, 847 P.2d at 303.
158. Id. at 36-37, 847 P.2d at 303-04.
159. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-105(1) (1993).
160. State v. Langford, 254 Mont. 44, 833 P.2d 1127 (1992) (addressing on merits
claim that hanging is cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Langford, 250 Mont. 542, 822
P.2d 1092 (1991) (unpublished opinion denying petition); State v. Langford, 249 Mont. 385,
819 P.2d 151 (1991) (addressing new claim that capital punishment statutes are
unconstitutional).
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legality of their sentence. 16 ' This is especially true where petition1 62
ers claim that their plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily.
However, the court may find a waiver if the accused did not make
an objection during proceedings in the trial court.'I s
Nevertheless, in Tecca, a decision squarely out of line with
this precedent and unquestionably lacking in equity, the court held
that a petitioner had waived his right to bring forth claims of new
evidence because he failed to appeal. 6 4 Although the decision is
based in part on the petitoner's failure to identify the new evidence, its grounding on the procedural rule is ill-advised. The only
way that a defendant may bring claims of new evidence before the
court without resorting to the common-law writs is by means of a
petition for post-conviction relief. It appears that the court set out
in Tecca to preclude a federal habeas remedy. The court stated in
the last paragraph of its opinion:
We note that it has long been the rule that federal courts will
decline review of State court decisions based upon independent
and adequate State grounds, which include procedural bars. The
United States Supreme Court has made it clear that State appellate decisions clearly state, as we have here, the procedural basis
for dismissing post-conviction relief claims 16in5 order to preclude
later review by federal courts on the merits.
Montana does not have a clearly established rule of waiver.
While the Montana Supreme Court adopted a useable standard in
Fitzpatrick and Henricks, the rule only occasionally is followed
and has never been overruled. It appears that when the State
raises a claim of waiver, the supreme court's decision is driven primarily by its view of the merits of the prisoner's claim. The same
161. State v. Wilson, 198 Mont. 305, 645 P.2d 958 (1982) (considering claim of incompetence at time of entry of plea); State v. Brown, 193 Mont. 15, 629 P.2d 777 (1981) (complaining that trial judge failed to honor plea bargain); State v. Haynie, 186 Mont. 374, 607
P.2d 1128 (1980) (considering claims that petitioner did not have assistance of counsel and
was not informed of maximum penalty when entering guilty plea); State v. Maldonado, 176
Mont. 322, 578 P.2d 296 (1978) (following plea, raising claims of selective prosecution, ex
post facto application of the persistent offender statute, and lack of probable cause to
charge); Spinler v. State, 152 Mont. 69, 446 P.2d 429 (1968) (finding erroneous discharge of
defendant from custody absent a formal hearing on habeas corpus petition); Morigeau v.
State, 149 Mont. 85, 423 P.2d 60 (1967) (addressing claim that sentence should run concurrently on merits). But see Hagan v. State,

-

Mont.

_

,-

P.2d

-

, 51 St. Rep. 230

(1994) (entry of plea constituted waiver of all non-jurisdictional claims, including claims of
violations of constitutional rights, that arose prior to the entry of the plea).
162. State v. Cavanaugh, 207 Mont. 237, 673 P.2d 482 (1983).
163. State v. Hintz, 213 Mont. 364, 691 P.2d 814 (1984) (addressing on merits claim
that pre-sentence report should have been prepared, but finding waiver by failure to object).
164. Tecca v. McCormick, 246 Mont. 317, 806 P.2d 11 (1990).
165. Id. at 319, 806 P.2d at 12 (citations omitted).
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may be said about claims that prisoners waive their rights to postconviction relief when they enter guilty pleas. These decisions also
appear to be driven by the court's view of the merits.
VII.

SHOULD THE MONTANA COURTS FOLLOW FITZPATRICK OR
STRICTLY APPLY SECTION

46-21-105?

The holdings in Fitzpatrick/Henricksand section 46-21-105
appear to conflict. However, the conflict is not irreconcilable. A
narrow reading of section 46-21-105 would be consistent with the
Fitzpatrick/Henricksstandard.
A number of reasons favor use of the Fitzpatrick/Henricks
standard. First, when accuseds unintentionally fail to raise grounds
in the trial court or on appeal, and the grounds are deemed waived
or barred by res judicata on post-conviction relief, they are forced
to assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This is the observation of the ABA Standards: "Narrowing access to postconviction relief on the ground of procedural default at an earlier stage in
the proceedings is likely to add to the burgeoning claims for postconviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel."" 6 An ineffective assistance claim requires both a showing that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance or omission was sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 6 7 Therefore, the
district court must ultimately address the merits of a claim, albeit
in the context of applying the standard of proof of an ineffective
assistance claim. Since a strictly applied waiver rule ultimately
converts the same issues to ineffective assistance claims, the burden imposed on the court is greater than it would have been if the
court had tackled the merits head-on. The trial court will necessarily be forced first to address the question of waiver, second, the
question of prejudice-whether counsel's omission went to a meritorious issue, and finally, whether counsel's performance fell below
a standard of reasonableness.
A strict application of the waiver rule is inconsistent with
ABA Standards for Post-Conviction Relief and with the recommendations of the Uniform Law Commissioners, who have adopted
the ABA Standards. 6' 8 The ABA agrees that "deliberately and
166.
167.

IV ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22-6S (Supp. 1986).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984).

168. UPCPA § 3 cmts. (1993 Supp.); ABA

STANDARDS FOR POsT-CoNvICTION REMEDIES

§ 6.1(b) (1968) ("[cllaims advanced in post-conviction applications should be decided on
their merits, even though they might have been, but were not fully and finally litigated in
the proceedings leading to judgment and conviction"); § 6.1(d) ("[b]ecause of the special
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knowingly" withholding issues should constitute a waiver, but suggests that even in those instances the courts should not deny relief
in all cases. 16e
In Tecca the court appeared to attempt to foil the petitioner's
opportunity to seek federal review of his claims. The court's role is
in meting out justice, not in defeating potential federal claims.
Opinions such as Tecca tend to portray the court as an arm of the
prosecution.
Since federal courts that hear petitions for writs of habeas
corpus are required to defer to state court findings of fact, it would
be a better use of judicial resources, federal and state, to resolve
arguably waived issues on their merits. In those cases, state courts,
rather than federal, will determine the facts on which any federal
habeas petition is decided. As we have seen, the Montana Supreme
Court's inconsistent approach to the question of waiver ensures
that federal district courts will engage in fact-finding on the
merits.
VIII.

LIMITATIONS AND DELAY

Until 1981, the MPCHA provided that a post-conviction petition could be filed "at any time after conviction."' 7 0 The court applied this provision literally,' but drew the line at long-in-the72
tooth requests to revoke a plea.'
The Montana Legislature amended section 46-21-102 of the
Montana Code in 1981 and established a five-year statute of limitations.'7 Notwithstanding this amendment, the court continued
to hear late post-conviction petitions. In McGuinn v. Risley, decided three years after the amendment was adopted, the court
held: "We hold that this petition could be dismissed for failure to
file the same within five years of the date of conviction, but we will
importance of rights subject to vindication ... courts should be reluctant to deny relief to
meritorious claims on procedural grounds").
169. ABA STANDARDS FOR POST-CoNvICTION REMEDIES § 2.4(b).

170.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 46-21-102 (1979).

171. See In re McNair, 189 Mont. 321, 615 P.2d 916 (1980) (hearing petition to revoke
plea made eight and one-half years after conviction); State v. Haynie, 186 Mont. 374, 607
P.2d 1128 (1980) (noting that motion to withdraw plea was untimely, but deciding issues on
merits).
172. State v. Standley, 192 Mont. 54, 626 P.2d 248 (1981) (holding that although the
statute provides no limitations period, impracticality will bar a petition for post-conviction
relief filed 25 years later, where the relief is a retrial).
173. 1981 Mont. Laws 271, § 2. The statute begins to run from the date of conviction.
This limitations period seems unrealistic given the time required for a direct appeal, a petition for writ of certiorari, or a petition for review of sentence pursuant to §§ 46-18-901 to 905 of the Montana Code.
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reach and dispose of the contentions on the merits in the exercise
of our discretion.' ' 4
The supreme court's decision in McGuinn is consistent with
the ABA Standards, which observe that "[a] specific time period as
a statute of limitations to bar post-conviction review of criminal
convictions is unsound."' 17 5 As with the doctrines of waiver and res
judicata, state courts' application of a limitations period will be an
independent and adequate state ground that will bar consideration
of the case by federal courts. Since our courts also apply the statute of limitations inconsistently, federal courts are unlikely to consider it to be an independent and adequate state ground. Our
courts have also avoided the limitations period by reverting to preMPCHA days and applying unnamed common-law remedies.
IX.

THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AFTER ENACTMENT OF THE

MPCHA
The MPCHA cannot be the exclusive remedy for post-conviction relief.' 76 Article VII, sections 2 and 4, of the Montana Constitution give the supreme court and the district courts the power to
"issue all writs appropriate to [their] jurisdiction." The legislature
cannot curtail that power.
Nevertheless, it was the Criminal Law Commission's express
intent to "limit the scope of habeas corpus to its historical position
in Montana."'' 77 Where a prisoner is barred from seeking post-conviction relief, for example, by the MPCHA statute of limitations,
he should have resort to the writ of habeas corpus. The question
then becomes: What is the scope of the writ or what was its historical position in Montana? In connection with this, we must also ask:
What effect, if any, did the adoption of the 1972 Constitution have
174.

210 Mont. 349, 351, 681 P.2d 699, 700 (1984).

175.

IV ABA

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

22-2.4(a) (2d ed. Supp. 1986). The

UPCPA contains no limitations period.
176. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (enactment of a post-conviction procedure does not eliminate the remedy of the writ); Marshall v. Warden, 434 P.2d 437 (Nev.
1967) (holding exclusive remedy provision of post-conviction collateral remedy act
unconstitutional).
177. The Commission stated:
This chapter has been narrowed in an attempt to limit the scope of habeas corpus
to its historical position in Montana. It is intended that most post conviction remedies will be provided by the post conviction hearing section. In any event, it must
be noted that the scope of the writ is broader than it once was due to the federal
decisions. Further habeas corpus is not controlled by statutory law, but rather by
case development, thus making it necessary to have only a general outline available in the code.
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 35, at § 95-2701 cmt.
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on the writ?
Historically, the writ was granted where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, lacked jurisdiction over the
17
person, or lacked the power to render the pronounced judgment. 1
Although the pre-1966 habeas cases were limited to the question of
a court's jurisdiction, the supreme court has since entertained petitions for writs of habeas corpus as petitions for some unnamed
kind of relief, where their grounds fall outside those common to
178. State ex rel. District Court, 35 Mont. 321, 89 P. 63 (1907); In re Downey, 31
Mont. 441, 78 P. 772 (1904) (questioning whether police court had jurisdiction); see In re
Parks, 3 Mont. 426 (1880); United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880) (denial of speedy trial);
Territory ex rel. McCann v. Sheriff, 6 Mont. 297, 12 P. 662 (1887) (a failure to follow statutory commitment procedures such that the commitment is rendered void); In re Shannon,
11 Mont. 67, 27 P. 352 (1891) (information or indictment insufficient on its face such as
where the Court finds that the complaint could refer to acts of contempt against a different
court; conduct privileged by the First Amendment); In re MacKnight, 11 Mont. 126, 27 P.
336 (1891) (newspaper article did not interfere with orderly administration of justice; conduct privileged under Montana Constitution and newspaper publication of account critical
of district court was outside the scope of the criminal contempt statute); State ex rel. Northrup v. Conrow, 13 Mont. 552, 35 P. 240 (1893) (denial of speedy trial); State ex rel. Hendricks v. Seventh Judicial District Court, 14 Mont. 452, 37 P. 9 (1894) (per curiam) (punishment exceeded the statutory minimum); In re Ming, 15 Mont. 79, 38 P. 228 (1894) (granting
writ where a string of egregious errors were commited); In re Ryan, 20 Mont. 64, 50 P. 129
(1897) (court lacked "geographical" jurisdiction); State ex rel. Donovan v. District Court, 26
Mont. 275, 67 P. 943 (1902) (evidence insufficient to establish probable cause); In re McCabe, 29 Mont. 28, 73 P. 1106 (1903) (conduct privileged under Montana constitution and
newspaper publication of account critical of district court was outside the scope of the criminal contempt statute); In re Terrett, 34 Mont. 325, 86 P. 266 (1906) (statute unconstitutional on its face); State ex rel. Murray v. District Court, 35 Mont. 504, 90 P. 513 (1907)
(excessive bail); In re Farrell, 36 Mont. 254, 92 P. 785 (1907) (facts were insufficient to allege
an offense); In re Wisner, 36 Mont. 298, 92 P. 958 (1907) (alleged offense unknown to the
criminal law); State ex rel. Browne v. Booher, 43 Mont. 569, 118 P. 271 (1911) (writ of
prohibition does not lie to challenge constitutionality of statute; the remedy is either the
writ of habeas corpus, or appeal); In re Jones, 46 Mont. 122, 126 P. 929 (1912) (evidence
held to be sufficient); In re Collins, 51 Mont. 215, 152 P. 40 (1915) (trial court tried to avoid
indeterminate sentencing statute by imposing sentence of not less than two years and not
more than two years); In re Lewis, 51 Mont. 539, 154 P. 713 (1916) (trial court tried to avoid
indeterminate sentencing statute by imposing sentence of not less than two years and not
more than two years); In re Naegele, 70 Mont. 129, 224 P. 269 (1924) (banking statute having been repealed by implication, the indictment failed to state an offense); State ex rel.
Foot v. District Court, 72 Mont. 374, 233 P. 957 (1925) (revocation of suspended sentence
after term of sentence had expired; justice court lacked authority to revoke probation where
statute conferred authority upon Board of Prison Commissioners); In re Klune, 74 Mont.
332, 240 P. 286 (1925); State ex rel. Foot v. District Court, 77 Mont. 290, 250 P. 973 (1926)
(petitioner claimed that her marriage placed her outside the scope of the juvenile statute
and sought release from a youth home); Ex parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P.2d 438
(1935) (justice of peace lacked authority to revoke probation); Ex parte Anderson, 125
Mont. 331, 238 P.2d 910 (1950) (state White Slave Act is pre-empted by the Mann Act and
is therefore unconstitutional; since unconstitutional law is void, a conviction under it is void,
rather than erroneous); State ex rel. Wetzel v. Ellsworth, 143 Mont. 54, 387 P.2d 442 (1963)
(per curiam) (where suspended sentence counted as time served, petitioner was confined
beyond his release date).
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the writ's historical position in Montana.
The most notable exam9
ple is the case of State v. Perry.1
Perry had been convicted of homicide and rape, largely on the
testimony of Michael Stillings, who entered into a plea bargain in
return for his testimony against Perry. Seventeen years later, Stillings recanted his testimony. Perry sought release, having always
asserted his innocence. Although he denominated his petition as a
motion for new trial or other relief, the State asserted that Perry's
was in fact a petition for post-conviction relief and was therefore
barred by the MPCHA's five-year statute of limitations. The
court's response is significant enough to set out in full:
Although Perry could not have brought his claim until the
recantation occurred in 1986, the State would have us find that
Perry's only means of redress is a petition for post-conviction review and that the statutory clock on such petitions ran in 1978.
We decline to do so. Under the interpretation urged by the State,
a defendant held in violation of his constitutional rights would be
deprived of a method of redress regardless of his diligence or the
justness of his claim. We do not believe such a result to be the
intent of the legislature nor consistent with our State Constitution. See 1972 Montana Constitution, Art. II, § 17 [the Due Process Clause of the Declaration of Rights].
The central function of the courts is the achievement of justice. However, like all endeavors of man, the search for justice is
not without occasional flaws. From the time of the Magna Charta,
the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus has been liberally employed as
a means of guaranteeing that this judicial goal be accomplished
and that a miscarriage of justice will be remedied. See 3 Blackstone Comm. at 129 et seq. For at its heart, the writ represents an
acknowledgment of the principle that the rights of freedom of the
individual are worthy of protection.
Whereas Perry's motion for a new trial cannot technically be
denoted a petition for habeas corpus, nor do we treat it as such,
the claim nevertheless sounds in the nature of a petition for
habeas corpus. We determine that in this case, the single issue is
whether Perry is entitled to a new trial based on the proferred
evidence of another person doing the criminal act for which Perry
was convicted.1 80
The claim "sounds in the nature of a petition for habeas
corpus" but it "cannot technically be denoted a petition for writ of
habeas corpus." Then what was it? We can safely say that the nature of Perry's motion was that of a petition for error coram nobis.
179. 232 Mont. 455, 758 P.2d 268 (1988).
180. Perry, 232 Mont. at 462-63, 758 P.2d at 272-73.
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It could have been treated as such without expanding the scope of
habeas corpus (which is what the court, in its tortured paragraphs,
was trying to avoid) and without expanding the district court's
jurisdiction. 8 '
In any event, the conclusion to be drawn at this stage is that
the writ of habeas corpus is now limited to its historical uses in
Montana-those of challenging a court's jurisdiction or of declaring a court's judgment to be otherwise void. 18 It does not appear
that the adoption of the 1972 Constitution changes this conclusion.
The constitutional convention only struck language from the 1889
Constitution that permitted the legislature to suspend the writ in
times of "rebellion or invasion."'8 s It made no other changes to the
1889 provision. Nothing in the convention's discussion of this provision indicated an intent to expand the scope of the writ.''
The case law on this subject leaves us with some abiding conclusions. First, the writ of habeas corpus is more limited in scope
than it perhaps was in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, the courts will
continue to hear post-conviction cases under a common-law theory
if they deem them meritorious, notwithstanding the defenses the
State might have raised under the MPCHA. Third, the writ of error coram nobis is alive and well.
X.

CONCLUSION

The boundaries of the Montana Post-Conviction Hearing Act
remain unclear after nearly thirty years of litigation under the Act.
It is clear that the MPCHA has fulfilled its drafters' dreams of
establishing a simple, all-encompassing post-conviction remedy.
However, it does not satisfy many interests in finality that one
might assert. This is not the result of the formulation of the
181. Perry discovered, when he filed his motion, that the prosecution had failed to
divulge significant exculpatory information. Apparently, Stillings had been attempting to
build an alibi for a period when Perry would have been absent. His efforts appeared in
letters he wrote before his arrest and were inconsistent with Stillings' testimony that Perry
had committed the crime at a later time. Perry had also written a letter admitting guilt.
This, too, was not produced to the defense. The Montana Supreme Court denied relief to
Perry, whereupon he decamped to the United States Court of Appeals (via the United
States District Court) and was ordered released. Perry v. Montana, 976 F.2d 737 (9th Cir.
1992).
182. See Remington v. Department of Corrections, 255 Mont. 480, 844 P.2d 50 (1992)
(claim of imprisonment beyond release date); State v. Sor-Lokken, 247 Mont. 343, 805 P.2d
1367 (1991) (claim of excessive bail). But see Benjamin v. McCormick, 243 Mont. 252, 792
P.2d 7 (1990) (granting release on parole to prisoner who was told at sentencing that he
would serve only one year).
183. Compare MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 21 with MONT. CONST. of 1972, art. II,
§ 19.
184. V MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1971-72, at 1764 (1981).
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MPCHA itself, but rather is a result of the Montana Supreme
Court's application and interpretation of the MPCHA. Nevertheless, as the case of State v. Perry illustrates, it serves the ends of
justice to hear claims on their merits even when they are out of
time or arguably are waived.
If the Montana Supreme Court is going to apply a strict rule
of waiver, it will have to do so at the risk of passing over cases in
which a prisoner has meritorious claims, even those cases such as
Perry in which the prisoner is factually innocent. 186 Otherwise, the
court should interpret the MPCHA in a manner consistent with
the ABA Standards. This will permit review of meritorious, but
arguably waived, grounds for relief and permit denial of clearly
abusive petitions. Until the court sets a clear course, federal courts
are not likely to dismiss habeas claims of Montana's prisoners on
independent and adequate state grounds.

185. Here, "factually innocent" refers to those accuseds who did not commit a crime,
as opposed to those accuseds who would not have been proven guilty but for the fact that
their convictions were obtained in violation of law.
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